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Thomas Hurka has never quite gained the recognition he deserves.  Of course, he is Chancellor 
Henry N.R. Jackson Distinguished Professor of Philosophical Studies at the University of 
Toronto and his CV contains a long list of articles published in the best philosophical journals 
and a number of books by the most prestigious academic presses.  And yet, his work has never 
been at the centre of the most intensive debates in moral philosophy.  I hope that the publication 
of the three excellent books reviewed here will play its part in changing this unfortunate state of 
affairs. 
 
On the surface, these three books seem very different from one another. Drawing Morals 
is a collection of fifteen previously published articles by Hurka.  These essays cover a wide 
range of topics in moral philosophy from population ethics to more abstract value theory, the 
notion of desert, capital punishment, nationalism, and just war theory.  Underivative Duty is, in 
contrast, a collection of articles edited by Hurka.  Its articles have been written by a close circle 
of leading moral philosophers who are united by their interest in English moral philosophy 
written between 1870 and 1950s.  Finally, The Best Things in Life is a wonderful short book 
written for a general audience.  This easily accessible book explores the many things that are 
good for us. 
 
 Despite appearances, Hurka’s work in these books is highly systematic.  The unified 
theme of his work is best explained in the article ‘Normative Ethics: Back to the Future’, which 
opens the Drawing Morals collection.  Hurka begins this essay by openly declaring his love of 
the moral philosophers who worked in England in the late 19th and the early 20th Century.  This 
group of brilliant philosophers included Sidgwick, Moore, Rashdall, McTaggart, Ross, Pritchard, 
Broad, Ewing, and many others.  
 
 Even if they disagreed about many things, the majority of these philosophers shared a 
view about the fundamental nature of morality.  Their basic metaethical conviction was that there 
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are objective ethical truths and that these sui generis truths cannot be derived from the truths 
about any other subject matter.  This led many of the British Intuitionists to attempt to formulate 
a small number of more general ethical principles which would cohere with our intuitive ethical 
judgments about individual cases.  Thus, on this picture, all moralizing is done within the 
autonomous ethical realm.  Its purpose is to make explicit the ethical understanding contained in 
our shared moral sensibility. 
 
 Since the 1950s, this view of moral philosophy has been viciously attacked from many 
directions.  Moral error theorists have claimed that there are no ethical truths at all; contemporary 
naturalists have argued that ethical truths just are a type of natural truths; constructivists have 
tried to generate the moral truths by using procedures offering an Archimedean point of view; 
and particularists have attempted to show that our moral intuitions cannot be captured by a finite 
number of general moral principles.  Given this barrage of objections, it is no wonder that the 
views of the Hurka’s heroes fell out of fashion during the second half of the 20th century. 
 
 In this context, non-naturalist realists have two ways of reacting to the previous set of 
challenges.  The reactive response would be to explain in detail case by case what is wrong with 
error theory, naturalism, constructivism and particularism.  The problem with this route is that it 
will lead to very little new ethical understanding.  I am happy to report that this has never been 
Hurka’s approach.   
 
Instead, Hurka has been defending the basic theoretical framework of the British 
Intuitionists in a much more constructive way.  Much of his work can be read as an attempt to 
specify what new moral understanding can be achieved within that framework.  This way of 
defending a certain way of doing moral philosophy contains an insight that has often been 
overlooked in moral philosophy.  Views in both metaethics and normative ethics should also be 
evaluated by how fruitful they are in ethics more broadly.  If certain otherwise controversial 
theoretical assumptions lead to a general research project that can shed light on many different 
ethical problems, then this must count as one reason for accepting those assumptions.  
 
 In what follows I shall discuss each of the three books under review in turn. 
 
1. As mentioned earlier, Drawing Morals contains fifteen articles by Hurka.  These articles cover 
a large number of central topics in moral philosophy.  They have been previously published in 
some of the most prestigious philosophical journals including The Journal of Philosophy, Ethics, 
Noûs, and Philosophy and Public Affairs.  All these essays are admirably clearly written.  They 
also frequently provide illuminating historical background for many contemporary ethical 
debates.  Furthermore, they are consistently thorough in their argumentation, often original and 
in some places even entertaining.  For reasons of space, I can discuss briefly here only three of 
these essays. 
 
  “The Value and Population Size” is an important early contribution to the so-called 
population ethics.  Almost everyone agrees that human wellbeing is important: given this, we all 
prefer to have as much of it as possible.  This line of thought quickly leads to well known 
paradoxes.  If we maximise the total amount of wellbeing, we end up creating a huge number of 
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not very well off people.  If we try to maximise the average amount of wellbeing instead, we will 
only need a few people with a high level of wellbeing.  
 
 In order to avoid these paradoxes, Hurka suggested in 1983 that the value of human 
wellbeing varies depending on how many people exist.  In small populations, additional 
wellbeing has more value and so more individuals should be created.  In large populations in 
contrast, adding more wellbeing no longer makes the state of affairs better and so no new 
individuals are required.  It is evident how Hurka here follows his own methodological 
guidelines.  The value of wellbeing in different contexts is here assessed on the basis of our 
moral intuitions about population sizes.  All theorizing is done within the ethical perspective. 
 
 Of course, Hurka’s article was not the final word in population ethics.  It was soon shown 
that Hurka’s variable rate view on its own leads to other paradoxical consequences.  However, 
this objection was pre-empted by Hurka in the original essay.  He openly admits that any single 
ethical principle is unlikely to capture all our population-intuitions on its own.  Even if this were 
correct, more work would still be needed to show that a small non-paradoxical set of moral 
principles could be constructed by using Hurka’s method. 
 
 Perhaps the most original and interesting part of Hurka’s work has been his theory of 
virtues and their value.  Much of the current literature on virtue ethics accepts the following three 
theses: (i) virtues are stable character-traits that are conducive to human flourishing, (ii) we can 
only make sense of virtuous acts and attitudes in terms of the virtuous character-traits, and (iii) 
virtues are the greatest good.  
 
 In ‘How Great a Good Is Virtue?’ and ‘Virtuous Act, Virtuous Disposition’ Hurka 
attempts to challenges these widely accepted theses.  On his view, virtuous attitudes are the basic 
starting-point.  They can be defined as those attitudes to goods and evils which are intrinsically 
good.  Here, intrinsically good attitudes consist of a love of good things and a hatred of bad ones 
in proportion to their value/disvalue.  So, a motive to do an act is courageous if it strikes the right 
balance between wanting to pursue a good outcome (loving the good) and wanting to be safe 
from harm (hating the bad). 
 
 By using this account of virtuous motives, Hurka achieves two things.  Firstly, the view 
can be used to understand virtuous character-traits in a novel way.  They just are dispositions to 
have virtuous motives.  Secondly, this view can be used to undermine the idea that virtue is the 
greatest good.  This conclusion follows from the highly plausible principle that a loving attitude 
towards something that is good cannot have more value than the object of the attitude.  If this 
principle were not true, then, for example, a teacher’s desire for her student to acquire a certain 
piece of knowledge could have more value than fact that the student comes to acquire it.  If we 
want to avoid this awkward conclusion, then we had better think that the objects of virtuous 
attitudes are more important than the virtuous attitudes themselves.  
 
 Given how thoroughly Hurka argues for these unusual views about virtues here and in his 
other works, his perfectionist theory of virtues would certainly deserve to be discussed more in 
virtue ethics.  Likewise, Hurka’s essays on value theory, autonomy, desert, capital punishment, 
nationalism, and just war collected that are here deserve to be studied more closely.  
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2. In 2008, Hurka organised a conference on British Moral Philosophers from Sidgwick to Ewing 
at the University of Toronto.  Most of the articles collected in the book Underivative Duty were 
first presented at that conference.  These articles are from ten philosophers who are both leading 
experts on this period of the history of moral philosophy and also leading contemporary ethicists. 
 
 In the first introductory article of the collection, Hurka explains the basic interests and 
views that were shared by the philosophers who are the focus of the collection.  These 
philosophers are Hurka’s heroes, already mentioned above: Sidgwick, Moore, Prichard, Ross, 
Ewing, and several others working in England between 1870 and 1950s.  Metaphysically, these 
philosophers were often non-naturalist realists.  In normative ethics, many of them believed there 
to be a set of basic and distinct moral values and duties.  They were also often interested in the 
conceptual relations between different ethical, normative, and evaluative concepts.  
 
 One nice thing about this collection of articles is that many of its essays discuss in 
illuminating detail both the views of the less well-known moral philosophers of the period and 
the less often discussed views and arguments of the household names.  In terms of historical 
scholarship, all the essays are first class.   
 
 By and large, the essays  fall into two categories.  Some of the contributors have chosen a 
more historical route: they are motivated by the question of what X really thought.  Roger 
Crisp’s investigation of Henry Sidgwick’s views of pleasure, Dennis McKerlie’s discussion of 
McTaggart’s claims about love and its value, and T. H. Irwin’s article on the Intuitionists’ 
interpretations of Aristotle belong to this category.  
 
In contrast, many other contributions of the volume approach the historical figures of the 
collection through the lenses of contemporary moral philosophy.  Here the focus is much more 
on whether the historical figures could provide additional resources for the contemporary 
debates.  Robert Shaver’s discussion of deontology and agent-relative reasons through Ross and 
Carritt, Philip Stratton-Lake’s argument against derivative prima facie duties on the basis of 
Ross, and Olson and Timmons’ discussion of metaethical non-naturalism through Ewing belong 
to this category. 
 
Underivative Duty is a worthwhile collection of articles.  Its reader is guaranteed to learn 
more about both an important group of underappreciated moral philosophers and the central 
debates in contemporary moral philosophy.  However, the articles also show how difficult it is to 
strike a balance between historical exegesis and the contemporary debates in this kind of work.  
Some of the more historically orientated essays fail to explain what is original and important 
about the explained theories.  In contrast, in some of the more original contributions, the thin 
connection to the historical figures seems redundant.  Fortunately, some essays like Dancy’s 
discussion of Prichard manage to find the right balance between historical clarification and 
original theorizing.  I would have also liked to have seen the work of this period to be subjected 
to a more critical analysis from a richer set of philosophical perspectives. 
 
3. My favourite book of the three is The Best Things in Life.  In this volume, Hurka shows that 
philosophers can write accessible and important books for the general audience if they want to.  
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The way in which Hurka has used his own philosophical views and the historical debates in 
moral philosophy to write a ‘self-help’ book worth reading is exemplary.   
 
 The first three chapters investigate different kinds of pleasures, happiness, and their 
value.  The message these chapters is that not all pleasures and pains are alike.  We can be in 
pleasant moods but we also feel pleasure that things are in a certain way.  Some pleasures are 
isolated incidents whereas others lead to other pleasant experiences. To some pleasures and pains 
we adjust quickly whereas other pleasures and pains retain their significance over time. Some 
pleasures can be pursued directly whereas others are spoiled by this approach. And, the value of 
pains and pleasures too depend on the context. Moving from an intense pain to a slightly less 
intense pain is always important, whereas if are you already living a pleasant life experiencing 
more pleasures might not be that significant. 
 
 Chapter 4 explores the value of knowledge. Hurka highlights the importance of 
understanding, that is, of knowing general truths that can be used to explain the connections 
between a large number of more local truths. However, he also emphasises that such knowledge 
is not enough. We also need to be connected to the world by knowing our own particular place in 
it. Chapter 5 then uses the example of knowledge to construct an analogical view of 
achievements and their importance. On this view, activities that allow you to construct and fulfil 
structured and complex goals are more worthwhile than other pursuits.  
 
 Chapter 6 explains Hurka’s theory of virtue already mentioned above in a clear and 
accessible way. However, the book’s real highlight is its seventh chapter on love and 
relationships. On Hurka’s view, love is important because it allows us to enjoy all other goods. 
Love makes us feel good, it allows us to know others as persons, and it helps us to achieve 
complex goals together. Love is also a way of loving good things such as the happiness of others, 
and thus it is virtuous. This chapter also explores the often superficial features that attract us to 
love others and the unique historical qualities that make us continue to love our partners. It even 
contains a helpful section on when it is time to call it quits. Not only is this chapter 
philosophically interesting; it also expresses real wisdom.  
 
 Finally, the last chapter of this book considers how we should attempt to combine 
different values in order to live a well-rounded good life. Of course, this book will not give 
anyone a recipe to live a good life, but it does offer people many useful tools for thinking about 
their lives. I can only hope that this book will be read by many of those who often vocally claim 
that academic philosophers are too far removed from the most important practical questions. 
 
Jussi Suikkanen 
University of Birmingham 
